Posted by James Forshaw, Google Project Zero Object orientated remoting technologies such as DCOM and.NET Remoting make it very easy to develop an object-orientated interface to a service which can cross process and security boundaries. This is because they're designed to support a wide range of objects, not …
Posted by James Forshaw, Google Project Zero Back in 2021 I wrote a blog post about various ways you can build a virtual memory access trap primitive on Windows. The goal was to cause a reader or writer of a virtual memory address to halt for a significant (e …
Posted by Mateusz Jurczyk, Google Project Zero As previously mentioned in the second installment of the blog post series ( "A brief history of the feature" ), the binary format used to encode registry hives from Windows NT 3.1 up to the modern Windows 11 is called regf. In a …
Posted by Seth Jenkins, Google Project Zero This blog post provides a technical analysis of exploit artifacts provided to us by Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) from Amnesty International. Amnesty’s report on these exploits is available here. Thanks to both Amnesty International and Google's Threat Analysis Group for …
Posted by James Forshaw, Google Project Zero This is a short blog post about some recent improvements I've been making to the OleView.NET tool which has been released as part of version 1.16. The tool is designed to discover the attack surface of Windows COM and find …
Posted by Ivan Fratric, Google Project Zero Recently, one of the projects I was involved in had to do with video decoding on Apple platforms, specifically AV1 decoding. On Apple devices that support AV1 video format (starting from Apple A17 iOS / M3 macOS), decoding is done in hardware. However …
Posted by the Big Sleep team Introduction In our previous post, Project Naptime: Evaluating Offensive Security Capabilities of Large Language Models, we introduced our framework for large-language-model-assisted vulnerability research and demonstrated its potential by improving the state-of-the-art performance on Meta's CyberSecEval2 benchmarks. Since then, Naptime has evolved into Big …
Posted by Mateusz Jurczyk, Google Project Zero To a normal user or even a Win32 application developer, the registry layout may seem simple: there are five root keys that we know from Regedit (abbreviated as HKCR, HKLM, HKCU, HKU and HKCC), and each of them contains a nested tree …
Posted by Mateusz Jurczyk, Google Project Zero When tackling a new vulnerability research target, especially a closed-source one, I prioritize gathering as much information about it as possible. This gets especially interesting when it's a subsystem as old and fundamental as the Windows registry. In that case, tidbits of …
Posted by Sergei Glazunov and Mark Brand, Google Project Zero Introduction At Project Zero, we constantly seek to expand the scope and effectiveness of our vulnerability research. Though much of our work still relies on traditional methods like manual source code audits and reverse engineering, we're always looking for …
Posted by Seth Jenkins, Google Project Zero Introduction Android's open-source ecosystem has led to an incredible diversity of manufacturers and vendors developing software that runs on a broad variety of hardware. This hardware requires supporting drivers, meaning that many different codebases carry the potential to compromise a significant segment …
Posted by Mateusz Jurczyk, Google Project Zero Before diving into the low-level security aspects of the registry, it is important to understand its role in the operating system and a bit of history behind it. In essence, the registry is a hierarchical database made of named "keys" and "values …
Posted by Mateusz Jurczyk, Google Project Zero In the 20-month period between May 2022 and December 2023, I thoroughly audited the Windows Registry in search of local privilege escalation bugs. It all started unexpectedly: I was in the process of developing a coverage-based Windows kernel fuzzer based on the …
By Mark Brand, Google Project Zero Introduction It's finally time for me to fulfill a long-standing promise. Since I first heard about ARM's Memory Tagging Extensions, I've said (to far too many people at this point to be able to back out...) that I'd immediately switch to the first …
By Ian Beer A graph representation of the sandbox escape NSExpression payload In April this year Google's Threat Analysis Group, in collaboration with Amnesty International, discovered an in-the-wild iPhone zero-day exploit chain being used in targeted attacks delivered via malicious link. The chain was reported to Apple under a …
By Seth Jenkins, Project Zero Introduction In December 2022, Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) discovered an in-the-wild exploit chain targeting Samsung Android devices. TAG’s blog post covers the targeting and the actor behind the campaign. This is a technical analysis of the final stage of one of …
By Mark Brand, Project Zero Background In 2018, in the v8.5a version of the ARM architecture, ARM proposed a hardware implementation of tagged memory, referred to as MTE (Memory Tagging Extensions). Through mid-2022 and early 2023, Project Zero had access to pre-production hardware implementing this instruction set extension …
By Mark Brand, Project Zero Background In 2018, in the v8.5a version of the ARM architecture, ARM proposed a hardware implementation of tagged memory, referred to as MTE (Memory Tagging Extensions). In Part 1 we discussed testing the technical (and implementation) limitations of MTE on the hardware that …
By Mark Brand, Project Zero Background In 2018, in the v8.5a version of the ARM architecture, ARM proposed a hardware implementation of tagged memory, referred to as MTE (Memory Tagging Extensions). In Part 1 we discussed testing the technical (and implementation) limitations of MTE on the hardware that …
By Mark Brand, Project Zero In mid-2022, Project Zero was provided with access to pre-production hardware implementing the ARM MTE specification. This blog post series is based on that review, and includes general conclusions about the effectiveness of MTE as implemented, specifically in the context of preventing the exploitation …
Today, members of Google Project Zero and Google Cloud are releasing a report on a security review of Intel's Trust Domain Extensions (TDX). TDX is a feature introduced to support Confidential Computing by providing hardware isolation of virtual machine guests at runtime. This isolation is achieved by securing sensitive …
Posted by Tim Willis, Project Zero In late 2022 and early 2023, Project Zero reported eighteen 0-day vulnerabilities in Exynos Modems produced by Samsung Semiconductor. The four most severe of these eighteen vulnerabilities (CVE-2023-24033, CVE-2023-26496, CVE-2023-26497 and CVE-2023-26498) allowed for Internet-to-baseband remote code execution. Tests conducted by Project Zero …
Posted by Seth Jenkins, Project Zero For a fair amount of time, null-deref bugs were a highly exploitable kernel bug class. Back when the kernel was able to access userland memory without restriction, and userland programs were still able to map the zero page, there were many easy techniques …
Posted by Ivan Fratric, Project Zero Note: The vulnerability discussed here, CVE-2022-42855, was fixed in iOS 15.7.2 and macOS Monterey 12.6.2. While the vulnerability did not appear to be exploitable on iOS 16 and macOS Ventura, iOS 16.2 and macOS Ventura 13.1 nevertheless …
Seth Jenkins, Project Zero This blog post details an exploit for CVE-2022-42703 (P0 issue 2351 - Fixed 5 September 2022), a bug Jann Horn found in the Linux kernel's memory management (MM) subsystem that leads to a use-after-free on struct anon_vma. As the bug is very complex (I certainly struggle …