Posted by the Big Sleep team Introduction In our previous post, Project Naptime: Evaluating Offensive Security Capabilities of Large Language Models, we introduced our framework for large-language-model-assisted vulnerability research and demonstrated its potential by improving the state-of-the-art performance on Meta's CyberSecEval2 benchmarks. Since then, Naptime has evolved into Big …

Posted by Mateusz Jurczyk, Google Project Zero To a normal user or even a Win32 application developer, the registry layout may seem simple: there are five root keys that we know from Regedit (abbreviated as HKCR, HKLM, HKCU, HKU and HKCC), and each of them contains a nested tree …

Posted by Mateusz Jurczyk, Google Project Zero When tackling a new vulnerability research target, especially a closed-source one, I prioritize gathering as much information about it as possible. This gets especially interesting when it's a subsystem as old and fundamental as the Windows registry. In that case, tidbits of …

Posted by Sergei Glazunov and Mark Brand, Google Project Zero Introduction At Project Zero, we constantly seek to expand the scope and effectiveness of our vulnerability research. Though much of our work still relies on traditional methods like manual source code audits and reverse engineering, we're always looking for …

Posted by Seth Jenkins, Google Project Zero Introduction Android's open-source ecosystem has led to an incredible diversity of manufacturers and vendors developing software that runs on a broad variety of hardware. This hardware requires supporting drivers, meaning that many different codebases carry the potential to compromise a significant segment …

Posted by Mateusz Jurczyk, Google Project Zero Before diving into the low-level security aspects of the registry, it is important to understand its role in the operating system and a bit of history behind it. In essence, the registry is a hierarchical database made of named "keys" and "values …

Posted by Mateusz Jurczyk, Google Project Zero In the 20-month period between May 2022 and December 2023, I thoroughly audited the Windows Registry in search of local privilege escalation bugs. It all started unexpectedly: I was in the process of developing a coverage-based Windows kernel fuzzer based on the …

By Mark Brand, Google Project Zero Introduction It's finally time for me to fulfill a long-standing promise. Since I first heard about ARM's Memory Tagging Extensions, I've said (to far too many people at this point to be able to back out...) that I'd immediately switch to the first …

By Ian Beer A graph representation of the sandbox escape NSExpression payload In April this year Google's Threat Analysis Group, in collaboration with Amnesty International, discovered an in-the-wild iPhone zero-day exploit chain being used in targeted attacks delivered via malicious link. The chain was reported to Apple under a …

By Seth Jenkins, Project Zero Introduction In December 2022, Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) discovered an in-the-wild exploit chain targeting Samsung Android devices. TAG’s blog post covers the targeting and the actor behind the campaign. This is a technical analysis of the final stage of one of …

By Mark Brand, Project Zero Background In 2018, in the v8.5a version of the ARM architecture, ARM proposed a hardware implementation of tagged memory, referred to as MTE (Memory Tagging Extensions). In Part 1 we discussed testing the technical (and implementation) limitations of MTE on the hardware that …

By Mark Brand, Project Zero Background In 2018, in the v8.5a version of the ARM architecture, ARM proposed a hardware implementation of tagged memory, referred to as MTE (Memory Tagging Extensions). In Part 1 we discussed testing the technical (and implementation) limitations of MTE on the hardware that …

By Mark Brand, Project Zero Background In 2018, in the v8.5a version of the ARM architecture, ARM proposed a hardware implementation of tagged memory, referred to as MTE (Memory Tagging Extensions). Through mid-2022 and early 2023, Project Zero had access to pre-production hardware implementing this instruction set extension …

By Mark Brand, Project Zero In mid-2022, Project Zero was provided with access to pre-production hardware implementing the ARM MTE specification. This blog post series is based on that review, and includes general conclusions about the effectiveness of MTE as implemented, specifically in the context of preventing the exploitation …

Today, members of Google Project Zero and Google Cloud are releasing a report on a security review of Intel's Trust Domain Extensions (TDX). TDX is a feature introduced to support Confidential Computing by providing hardware isolation of virtual machine guests at runtime. This isolation is achieved by securing sensitive …

Posted by Tim Willis, Project Zero Note: Until security updates are available, users who wish to protect themselves from the baseband remote code execution vulnerabilities in Samsung’s Exynos chipsets can turn off Wi-Fi calling and Voice-over-LTE (VoLTE) in their device settings. Turning off these settings will remove the …

Posted by Seth Jenkins, Project Zero For a fair amount of time, null-deref bugs were a highly exploitable kernel bug class. Back when the kernel was able to access userland memory without restriction, and userland programs were still able to map the zero page, there were many easy techniques …

Posted by Ivan Fratric, Project Zero Note: The vulnerability discussed here, CVE-2022-42855, was fixed in iOS 15.7.2 and macOS Monterey 12.6.2. While the vulnerability did not appear to be exploitable on iOS 16 and macOS Ventura, iOS 16.2 and macOS Ventura 13.1 nevertheless …

Seth Jenkins, Project Zero This blog post details an exploit for CVE-2022-42703 (P0 issue 2351 - Fixed 5 September 2022), a bug Jann Horn found in the Linux kernel's memory management (MM) subsystem that leads to a use-after-free on struct anon_vma. As the bug is very complex (I certainly struggle …

By Ian Beer, Project Zero Note: The vulnerabilities discussed in this blog post (CVE-2022-33917) are fixed by the upstream vendor, but at the time of publication, t hese fixes have not yet made it downstream to affected Android devices (including Pixel, Samsung, Xiaomi, Oppo and others). Devices with a …

Maddie Stone, Project Zero Note : The three vulnerabilities discussed in this blog were all fixed in Samsung’s March 2021 release. They were fixed as CVE-2021-25337, CVE-2021-25369, CVE-2021-25370. To ensure your Samsung device is up-to-date under settings you can check that your device is running SMR Mar-2021 or later …

By Felix Wilhelm, Project Zero Earlier this year, I discovered a surprising attack surface hidden deep inside Java’s standard library: A custom JIT compiler processing untrusted XSLT programs, exposed to remote attackers during XML signature verification. This post discusses CVE-2022-34169, an integer truncation bug in this JIT compiler …

A deep dive into an in-the-wild Android exploit Guest Post by Xingyu Jin, Android Security Research This is part one of a two-part guest blog post, where first we'll look at the root cause of the CVE-2021-0920 vulnerability. In the second post, we'll dive into the in - the -wild …

Posted by Maddie Stone, Google Project Zero This blog post is an overview of a talk, “ 0-day In-the-Wild Exploitation in 2022...so far”, that I gave at the FIRST conference in June 2022. The slides are available here. For the last three years, we’ve published annual year-in-review reports …

Posted by Ian Beer, Google Project Zero NOTE: This issue was CVE-2021-30983 was fixed in iOS 15.2 in December 2021. Towards the end of 2021 Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) shared an iPhone app with me: App splash screen showing the Vodafone carrier logo and the text " My …